Weeks in and out, we see that the defence procurement of India is in shambles with ad-hoc buys and eternals delays being the default option with most procurements. Apart from this, there is absolutely no clarity on some of the critical futuristic big platform capabilities with disagreements and various perspectives from different offices still playing out either behind closed doors or sometimes out in the open media.
Let's start with the third aircraft carrier for the Indian Navy that is discussed to no ends by veterans, journalists and defence enthusiasts on social media. There's a lot of doublespeak and/or mismatch between the Navy, the office of the CDS and the government(advised by NSA). "We are very clear that air power at sea is required. If you are a nation that has aspirations and wants to be a $5 trillion economy and do not want to be tethered to the shores...aircraft carriers are absolutely essential," Admiral Karambir Singh said. That's a very interesting statement to make. Cause, usually such a statement would flow from a National Security strategy document framed by the political leadership. The CNS could very well be making a rational statement but it definitely doesn't seem to have the civilian political leadership on board on such a strategy/assessment. Even the CDS doesn't seem to agree with the assessment. Ofcourse the CDS, being the first to occupy the office, comes from a purely Army background without joint command experience and may not have the right appreciation of the maritime domain in IOR to jump to such a conclusion.
Experts have been predicting that #aircraftcarriers will outlive their utility since as early as 1945. Yet, here we are with most naval powers still willing to invest in it in 2020 https://t.co/Fa4GuFItDm
— Firstpost (@firstpost) February 18, 2020
The Navy Chief, the CDS, the NSA and the cabinet need to sit across a table and discuss. The Navy seems to want something the govt doesn't seem to have the will and need to develop and actualize even after 10 years down the line. This mismatch between intentions, capabilities and funding isn't new to India but it does rather broadcast to the outside world how incoherent, rudderless and unprofessional our leadership is, when it comes to national security, secure interests and project power in our area of influence. The question that is being asked and debated in capitals in the region is, how much can India step up in reality to fulfill its obligations and/or secure its interests in the region.
Also both the govt and the CDS have spoken of a refocus towards the continental borders, where we might be facing a 2 front war, in a constrained budget environment. So it increasingly looks like the govt not necessarily disagrees with the Navy's perspective but isn't ready to accept that assessment, as that would force it to fund the third aircraft carrier and a whole host of naval power projection capabilities. This zero sum game is being played ruthlessly and we saw the CNS and CDS shadow boxing through the media.
Also both the govt and the CDS have spoken of a refocus towards the continental borders, where we might be facing a 2 front war, in a constrained budget environment. So it increasingly looks like the govt not necessarily disagrees with the Navy's perspective but isn't ready to accept that assessment, as that would force it to fund the third aircraft carrier and a whole host of naval power projection capabilities. This zero sum game is being played ruthlessly and we saw the CNS and CDS shadow boxing through the media.
IAF chief contradicts CDS Rawat, says plan is to buy 114 foreign fighters under Make in India besides LCA Tejas https://t.co/CD2tWGkKAk
— Snehesh Alex Philip (@sneheshphilip) May 18, 2020
The misunderstanding about MWF and MRCA 2.0 between the CDS and the IAF Chief is the second case in point. While the CDS made a statement in May 2020 that the IAF decided to go with the 83 LCA Mk1A instead of the MRCA 2.0 as an indigenous option, the IAF chief was quick to clarify that these are two different procurements and that the MRCA was absolutely necessary to fill certain important gaps in capabilities of the IAF air combat segment. While the LCA Mk1A and the MWF are expected to play a significant part of the future IAF fleet, the IAF leadership seems to not give up on the MRCA fighter. Here it doesn't help that the IAF has been less clear with regards to the MRCA in light of the existing domestic programs that have kicked off.
It's been more than 3 years since the changes to the institutions of National Security structure have come about with the formation of the Defence Planning Committee(DPC) under NSA Ajit Doval. It includes the Chiefs of Defense Staff, the three Service Chiefs, Defence Secretary, the Foreign Secretary, Expenditure Secretary, Principal Secretary in PMO . The mandate of the DPC included preparing a National Security Document, a capability development plan apart from improving defence manufacturing ecosystem in India.
The National Security Strategy document is yet to see the light of day. The long term capability development seems more to be run from the Finance ministry than from the Service Headquarters. The NSA and the RM obviously had empowered the office of CDS with wide ranging powers to conduct deep reforms. While the CDS has been successful in bringing about some reforms in functioning, administration and focusing on jointness with regards to logistics, the big ticket reforms still are in the back burner. Not to talk of the big theaterization start-stop drama and the subsequent turf wars that played out over the last month or so. The leadership that was expected from the office of CDS to resolve these issues amicably has clearly been AWOL for multiple reasons.
Where do we stand today?
From a funding perspective, usually in a list of 10 priorities between the services, we would expect any govt of a sovereignty hawk nation to prioritize and fund atleast 6 of them. But it seems that we might be forced to cut even priority 3 & 4 for the sake of priority 1 & 2 and that speaks of the dire budget situation we have put ourselves in. This is due to a variety of reasons including a relatively poor performing economy, inability to cut down on some welfare schemes and an overall lack of will to take long term bets in terms of capability development. In such a funding anemic environment, the service chiefs are forced to fight it out for capex, to take care of their services' needs. There is only so much efficient one can be with respect to cutting costs and beyond a point it starts to eat up actively into future capability developments for the sake of today's emergencies.
It is time the national security leadership of the country, stops deciding the strategy, posture and spending on capability development based on the "budget realities" and rather push for primacy of spending on national security albeit in a creative way(separate indigenous capex budget is a start) that can contribute to the economic growth of the nation as well as to the comprehensive national power of the nation. Second, the National Security Strategy document has to come out for everyone to understand what the government has in mind. Only when the government puts ink on paper can the services come out with what's needed to execute the strategy laid out by the national security leadership, and also hold the government of the day to account to fund adequately for the objectives and strategy laid out by the government itself. Else, no amount of political rhetoric, courage and bravery of the soldier on the ground, cries of "regional power" in various fora are going to help us secure our ever expanding interests without big compromises.
